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ABSTRACT

Patient safety should be the primary concern in implantable medical devices (IMD). The growing threat of security attacks on
networkable IMDs is an obvious risk to patient safety, because it can involve injury or death to the patient. In the case of
insulin pumps, vulnerabilities are well-documented and security frameworks have been recommended. In addition, several
government bodies have issued multiple advisories about security threats to IMDs. Furthermore, there is an ISO standards
initiative to promote secure design for insulin pumps and associated devices. However, device manufacturers look to the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for guidance during the pre-market approval process, and no standards are being
enforced. To date, a convincing cost/benefit analysis of the security issues has remained elusive. Structuration theory has
been used as a lens to understand the organizational process and the consequences of their choices.
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INTRODUCTION

The advanced capabilities of implantable medical devices (IMD) that can be administered remotely have introduced a futurecentric means of delivering healthcare (Aram, Shirvani, Pasero and Chouikha, 2016). IMDs connect through ubiquitous
networks which places the devices within the familiar Internet of Things (IoT) vector targeting network interfaces (Marin,
Singelée, Yang, Verbauwhede and Preneel, 2016) and device software (Zhang, Raghunathan and Jha, 2013). Cyber security
experts have appealed to the U.S. Congress in an effort to alert policy makers about the risks inherent in this new and
promising method of health delivery (Understanding the role of connected devices in recent cyber-attacks, 2016).
Medical device manufacturers have been reluctant to address security safeguards. Researchers reflect on a, “manufacturing
mindset and culture established before the IoT ever sprang into being” (Khera, 2017, p. 211). To date, a convincing
cost/benefit analysis of the security issues has remained elusive. To investigate this issue, this paper will use Baskerville’s
(1996) third-level security notation framework for method engineering to define a security imperative for IMDs.
Structuration theory and the conflict between subjective and objective realities in the organizational structure (Orlikowski and
Robey, 1991) will be used as a lens to understand the organizational processes that moderate the relationship between the
security imperative and design of medical devices. The insulin pump will serve as a case study of the factors that affect
secure design of this type of IMD.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Limited research exists about organizational perspectives that address why insulin pump security remains a major ongoing
issue despite the availability of suitable risk analysis and countermeasures. For example, processor power in insulin pumps
has improved within the least five to seven years and enables a cryptographic AES-based solution optimized for energy
consumption to function as an, “external shield” (Marin et al., 2016, p. 114) against the wireless network interface attack
vector. However, current insulin pump market leaders continue to use unencrypted Bluetooth technology on the basis that
limited close-range communication provides sufficient security protection. Such claims are illusory as data from medical
devices can be intercepted remotely (Applegate, 2013). The hacker tool Ubertooth One allows attackers “more than a
kilometer away” (Wolfe, 2017, p. 54) to intercept and download stored information from a device.
To establish the theoretical groundwork for sense-making of the phenomenon, this literature review introduces theoretical
aspects of the security imperative by Baskerville (1996) and provides examples of structural artifacts (Jones and Karsten,
2008; Orlikowski and Robey, 1991) in the organizational context of medical device manufacture. A review of research in
clinical practice allows insight about security threats for insulin pumps from the perspectives of medical professionals.
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A comprehensive examination of vulnerabilities, risk models, and frameworks is important to provide a status of medical
device security literature published by cyber security experts.
The Security Imperative

Traditionally, system security by design has been difficult to achieve, particularly in new products, as it frequently conflicts
with functionality (Baskerville, 1996). Technology development requirements, however, continue to advance rapidly.
Wireless connectivity is a key feature for IMDs, but the risk of inadequate security design accelerates with the number of
devices connected to the IoT (Khera, 2017; Zhang et al., 2015). The impact on personal health and safety due to potentially
inadequate security has raised the stakes to ensure appropriate safeguards. Researchers emphasize that medical device
interoperability and cyber security go hand in hand for the safe use of IMDs such as insulin pumps (Jones and Katzis, 2017).
Organizational Conflict: Duality of Structural Artifacts

Conflicting “realities of organizational structure” (Baskerville, 1996, p. 13) arise when participants each construct their
reality differently. Orlikowski and Robey (1991) assert the duality of such a condition because conflict is a social
phenomenon and contains subjective and objective elements. As a result, development methods that include the security
imperative may not reflect the reality of the structural artifact. This occurs where participants impose their [subjective] reality
of meeting a deadline over [objective] concerns that the decision of building an IMD with little attention to security flaws
may cause a major backlash down the road.
Security Imperative and Conflicting Realities

Baskerville’s (1996) framework for method engineering includes security elements in the design that define risks, assets, and
safeguards. These are linked through the levels of artifacts and add the capacity to produce an information system responsive
to the organizational structure. Baskerville’s view concurs with Orlikowski and Robey (1991) in their assumption that
individuals, groups, and organizations should be treated as different levels of analysis. The elements of Baskerville’s
framework illustrate the multi-dimensional structure of the artifacts contained in the security imperative.
Orlikowski and Robey (1991) positioned Giddens’ structuration theory into a framework to address the organizational
consequences of using a given system development method. Their assumptions about the relationship between structure and
action center on how information technology is created and used. Structuration theory explains the difference between
subjective views where a lack of emphasis on consequences prevails and objective views where the focus is on characteristics
and rules. This reflects the potential “collision of objects” (p. 147) in social systems such as organizations that are “created by
human action and then serve to shape future human action” (p. 147). If the subjective mindset to relax security design in
favor of responding to customer-centric features collides with the objective mindset that the security imperative is a logical
concept, the human action that attempts to address this conflict determines further action within the organization.
Unfortunately, people in organizations may allow their actions to be affected by the power of “socially constructed
abstractions” (Orlikowski and Robey, 1991, p. 147). Jones and Karsten (2008) confirm Giddens’ stance that the effect of
technology depends on how social agents carry out their actions. They refer to the voluntariness of human actions and base
this interpretation on Giddens’ theories when asserting that, “structure is always enabling as well as constraining” (p. 132).
Security Risks

Relevant literature identifies risks associated with medical devices as errors, malfunctions, and attack vectors (Aram et al.,
2016; Bergenstal et al., 2013; Camara, Peris-Lopez and Tapiador, 2015; Heinemann et al., 2015; Khera, 2017; Ross, Milburn,
Reith, Wiltshire and Wheeler, 2015). Ill-disposed adversaries who attempt to intercept and modify settings on insulin pumps
are of interest for this proposed study. While no malicious hacking incidents have yet been made public (Sackner-Bernstein,
2017), clinical researchers acknowledge that improper settings on insulin pumps can lead to severe injury or death
(Bergenstal et al., 2013; Ismail-Beigi, 2012) and could be induced by active adversaries (Applegate, 2013; SacknerBernstein, 2017).
A general assumption is that only sensitive targets are at risk, but research shows that IMDs—in their current design—are
widely susceptible to exploits (Applegate, 2013; Rushanan, Rubin, Kune and Swanson, 2014; Sackner-Bernstein, 2017).
Researchers point out worst-case scenarios and have demonstrated how an attacker can penetrate the system and change
settings on IMDs, including insulin pumps (Kramer and Fu, 2017; Li, Raghunathan and Jha, 2011).
Assets

IMD security researchers report that patient safety, patient health, and the medical device itself require risk assessment and
protection (Arney, Venkatasubramanian, Sokolsky and Lee, 2011; Blauw, Keith-Hynes, Koops and DeVries, 2016; Klonoff,
2017; Kramer and Fu, 2017). While this proposed study is limited to attack vectors pursued by active adversaries to control
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an IMD, the list of assets requiring protection includes potential connections to data centers via the Internet (Zhang et al.,
2015).
Patient safety is at risk when IMD settings can be changed or deleted and result in an incorrect actuation of treatment. If this
situation is not corrected, the patient’s health is impacted because an insulin pump is an important device designed to respond
to chronic health conditions and to stabilize the human endocrine system. Uninterrupted operation of the device is crucial to
the patient’s health.
IMD structure and firmware are not immune to damage from introduction of malware or from side-channel attacks (Arney et
al., 2011; Camara et al., 2015). A damaged insulin pump could require costly technical support, a visit to the Doctor’s office
to reprogram individualized pump settings, or replacement of parts in question. A new insulin pump not covered by insurance
can cost around $5,000 to replace.
Safeguards

Present safeguards for an IMD consist of operating integrity, access control, and error detection (Blauw et al., 2016; SacknerBernstein, 2017; Zhang et al., 2015). The software that controls the settings on IMDs, such as insulin pumps, should be
encrypted and communicate with an appropriate authorization protocol to other devices (Blauw et al., 2016; Marin et al.,
2016). Software should be subject to standards (Diabetes Technology Society, 2016), and upgrades should incorporate
findings from manufacturers’ post-market risk evaluations (Understanding the role of connected devices in recent cyberattacks, 2016).
Communication directions, frequency, and protocols should be carefully assessed (Blauw et al., 2016; Kramer and Fu, 2017).
In addition, alarms are crucial for error detection during the operation of insulin pumps because they frequently initiate an
insulin dosage adjustment (Bergenstal et al., 2013; Heinemann et al., 2015). If an attacker disables an alarm, the user would
not be aware of critical highs or lows in user blood glucose level to take recommended action (Ismail-Beigi, 2012). Thirdparty testing is recommended to assure that such safeguards are functioning as intended (Sackner-Bernstein, 2017).
METHODOLOGY
Theoretical Model

The proposed theoretical medical shown in Figure 1 is based on the third-level security notation framework for method
engineering by Baskerville (1996) and describes the, “security element representation notation” (p. 18). Baskerville’s
framework is modified to reflect the specific criteria representing a security imperative for implantable medical devices
(IMDs). The proposed framework to achieve secure design is moderated by the organizational conflict containing subjective
and objective elements. To investigate the causality of the factors that affect the secure design of IMDs, a critical realist case
study approach will be used. This allows the capturing of the participants’ subjective meanings of the phenomenon. Critical
realist-based research provides the foundation, “how and why a phenomenon occurred” (Wynn and Williams, 2012, p. 788).
Objective elements will be captured by performing a, “categorical aggregation to establish themes or patterns” (Creswell,
2013, p. 190) appropriate for case study research, using the third-level security notation framework by Baskerville (1996) as
a guide.
The Security Imperative for Implantable Medical Devices

This proposed case study will focus on risks posed by active adversaries, the protection of assets (patient safety, patient
health, and the insulin pump device), and the safeguards recommended for protection (operating integrity, access control,
error detection). In the case of insulin pumps where security vulnerabilities provide attack vectors that can potentially be used
by active adversaries, protective safeguards are needed to ensure patient safety, patient health, and the uninterrupted
operation of the device. These safeguards must consist of operating integrity, provide secure access control, and include error
detection functions to alert the user when settings are changing, a possible indication that an active adversary makes an
attempt to penetrate or has successfully hijacked the system.
H1: The security imperative for IMDs framework can achieve secure design in insulin pumps when risks of active
adversaries are identified and when safeguards such as operating integrity, access control, and error detection are
implemented to protect patient safety and health as well as the medical device itself. There is a positive relationship between
the implementation of the security imperative and the secure design of the medical device.
H2: The organizational conflict that arises due to the duality of subjective and objective elements in the organizational
structure is a moderator to the relationship between the security imperative and secure design when participants’ realities
collide.
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Figure 1. The Security Imperative for IMDs Model

Measurements and Analysis

This study will use purposive sampling via an Internet-based survey to collect information from a broad range of medical
device stakeholders. Open-ended questions will be subject to approval by the Nova Southeastern University Institutional
Review Board (IRB). Those to be surveyed include: Cybersecurity experts, who focus on medical device security; clinical
researchers familiar with insulin pump therapy; government officials and lawmakers with an expressed interest in medical
device security; clinical and security researchers who have focused specifically on diabetes device security; members of the
IEEE standards group who recently completed the ISO/IEEE 11073 standard for Personal Health Devices (X73PHD); insulin
pump manufacturer representatives; and individuals presently using insulin pump therapy. Follow-up personal contact with
additional questions or to clarify any items is recommended and anticipated (Salkind, 2013).
Case study research is ideal to obtain a thorough account of what is occurring (Salkind, 2013) and to derive, “detailed,
contextualized inferences” (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p. 107) to understand the dynamic process underlying the phenomenon. A
purposive sampling method is appropriate when, “all participants have experience of the phenomenon being studied”
(Creswell, 2013, p. 155). The Baskerville (1996) third-level security notation framework for method engineering will provide
the foundation to arrive at objectives for data collection. According to Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006), a theory is suitable as
an, “initial guide for design and data collection” (p. 303).
The survey will consist of open-ended questions because little is known about the nature of the phenomenon, and this method
will allow for a broad response (Salkind). According to Tan and Hunter (2002), obtaining narratives through open-ended
questions is a suitable approach. It reflects how humans, “construct and organize reality” (p. 1) and serves to understand and
interpret, “the social actions of developers and users involvement in the development of IS” (p. 1). A literature review of the
comprehensive identification and analysis of potential IMD threats will form the basis for the topics covered by the openended questions.
To create a framework that would allow the assessment if and what type of organizational factors moderate the relationship
between the security imperative and the secure design of IMDs, systematic classification and interpretation of the data into
codes and themes will be performed using the value-focused approach to security as suggested by Dhillon and Torkzadeh
(2006). This allows for the structuring of values and related objectives to be grouped according to the security notation
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framework into risks, assets, and safeguards. The subjective and objective realities identified in the same context will be rated
based on feedback from participants to assess if those hinder or contribute to the secure design of IMDs.
A pilot survey will be distributed to graduate students of information systems and computer science to solicit feedback to
eliminate poor wording choices and potential sources of confusion. This will enable a consensual validation of the
instrument by seeking the opinion of other IS researchers because of their implied competence in the field of information
systems and information systems security (Creswell, 2013). The literature review of IMD attack vectors and the pilot survey
will serve to establish content validity and the range of each construct (Petter, Straub and Rai, 2007).
CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY

The primary motivation for this study is to find plausible explanations that might shed light on the apparent reluctance of
IMD manufacturers to introduce comprehensive security features during the design phase. The implication being made is that
manufacturers design insulin pumps with certain built-in security features that are sufficient to satisfy the requirement for
FDA product approval to market. However, a more robust design is recommended based on the overwhelming volume of
research, case studies, and standards efforts to reduce security risks and protect the users of IMDs from physical harm.
Statistics gathered in 2015 (McAdams and Rizvi, 2016) show that an estimated 350,000 people in the United States alone use
insulin pump therapy. Applegate (2013) warns about a careless mindset that dispels the notion of kinetic cyber-attacks as an
aberration. A requirements determination for the design of information technology must include the security imperative
(Baskerville; 1996). Medical device security experts agree that, “security is most effective when designed into the system
from the very initial development cycle” (Sametinger, Rozenblit, Lysecky and Ott, 2015, p. 80). Using the concept of duality
of structures (Orlikowski and Robey, 1991) to help distinguish between objective and subjective realities, this proposed study
attempts to identify organizational factors that moderate the relationship between the security imperative and the secure
design. The information gathered from surveys and follow up interviews will be analyzed to identify and assess their impact
on this relationship.
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